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Respondent and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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aka FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF 
UTAH, a Utah banking corporation, 
Appellant and Defendant. Civil No. 19570 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, 
$ Utah banking corporation, 
Appellant and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
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LeGRANDE P. BELNAP, ARLENE B. 
WALDRON, LESLIE W. KING, PETTY 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, PETTY MOTOR 
COMPANY, RACHEL LUNT, DORIS 
BAGLEY BELNAP, and FIRST SECURITY 
BANK OF UTAH, N.A., 
Respondents and 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT-DEFENDANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action concerns the right of appellant to 
recover certain costs and attorney's fees incurred by 
appellant in defending against two actions that challenged 
the validity of the trust deed under which appellant was 
trustee and beneficiary. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following a trial, the district court held that 
appellant was estopped from collecting, as a part of the 
obligation secured by the subject trust deed, any attorney's 
fees or costs incurred by appellant in defending against two 
actions which had unsuccessfully challenged the validity of 
the subject trust deed, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's 
judgment that appellant is estopped from collecting its costs 
and attorney's fees under the subject trust deed, this 
Court's determination that appellant is entitled to collect 
such amounts, and an order remanding this case to the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County for a 
determination of the amount of costs and attorney's fees due 
appellant under the trust deed and further proceedings to 
foreclose the trust deed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 13, 1963, appellant First Interstate Bank of 
Utah, formerly named Walker Bank & Trust Company (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Bank"), extended a loan in the amount of 
$30,000.00 to Utahna P. Belnap. The loan was evidenced by a 
Promissory Note in the amount of $30,000.00 (the "Note") and 
was secured by a Trust Deed (the "Trust Deed") covering all 
of Lot 6, Indian Hills Plat B-l (hereinafter referred to as 
- ? -
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the "Property"). (Finding No. 1? R. 340-341). On July 28, 
1972/ Utahna Po Belnap died while married to LeGrande L. 
Belnap. The probate of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap 
followed* The Bank was appointed and served as the Special 
Administrator of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap. (Finding 
Nos. 2, 3j R. 341). 
During the probate proceeding, Utahna's husband, 
LeGrande L* Belnap, initiated two lawsuits, both of which 
were either a direct or indirect attack on either the 
validity of the title of the reputed owner, Utahna Belnap, or 
an attack on the Trust Deed (those two suits are hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as the "Actions"). (Finding No. 4; R. 
391). The Bank incurred costs and attorney's fees in 
successfully defending against the Actions. (Finding No. 5; 
R. 342). Both of the Actions were ultimately resolved in 
favor of the Bank. In one of the Actions, the district court 
determined that the Trust Deed was a subsisting and valid 
lien in favor of the Bank against the Property. (Finding No. 
6; R. 342). This Court affirmed that determination. (R. 
382-383). 
The Trust Deed, at paragraph 4, provides that the 
Trustor agrees: 
4. To appear in and defend any action or 
proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof, the title to said 
property, or the rights or powers of 
Beneficiary or Trustee; and should 
Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also 
appear in or defend any such action or 
- 3 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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proceeding, to pay all costs and 
expenses, including costs of evidence of 
title and attorney's fees in a reasonable 
sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No.2; T., 2/7/83, at 3-5; R. 375-377). 
During the probate of the estate of Utahna P. 
Belnap, the ownership of the Property encumbered by the Trust 
Deed was, pursuant to an agreement, awarded to LeGrande 
Belnap, and LeGrande Belnap agreed, as a part of that 
agreement, to assume and discharge the Trust Deed. (Finding 
No. 7; R. 342). Through a series of conveyances, plaintiff-
respondent in this case, Kenneth L. Rothey as Trustee of the 
Belnap Family Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Rothey"), 
acquired title to the Property covered by the Trust Deed. 
(Conclusion No. 2; R. 347). 
For in excess of five years, none of the scheduled 
payments under the Note were made to the Bank. (Finding No. 
17; R. 346). Accordingly, the Bank initiated a non-judicial 
foreclosure under the Trust Deed, and Rothey initiated this 
action seeking (i) to enjoin that non-judicial foreclosure 
and (ii) a determination that the Bank was not entitled to 
recover its costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending 
against the Actions. (Verified Complaint; R. 6-7). Rothey 
then secured a Temporary Restraining Order restraining the 
subject trustee's sale. (R. 29-30). The Temporary 
Restraining Order issued by the district court on July 28, 
1981, provided as follows in Paragraph 2: 
_ A _ 
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That as a condition precedent to the 
issuance hereof and in lieu of the 
posting of security or bond as required 
by Rule 65(a) (c), Plaintiff be and hereby 
is required to tender to Defendant the 
sum of $15,094.70, the amount of 
principal and interest due on the subject 
Trust Deed and Note. 
Following the district court's entry of the 
Temporary Restraining Order, Rothey served upon the Bank a 
"Tender of Payment" in "the sum of $15,094.70 representing 
the amount of the principal and interest due according to the 
Notice of Trustee's Sale filed and published by the 
Defendant." (R. 16, 27). Rothey delivered to the Bank his 
counsel's Trust Account check in that amount, and the Bank 
negotiated the check with the following endorsements 
Endorsement does not constitute accord 
and satisfaction. Payee reserves all 
claims and rights it has to collect its 
full administrative charges and 
attorney's fees under the Note and Trust 
Deed. 
First Interstate Bank (formerly 
known as Walker Bank & Trust 
Company) 
By: s/ 
Assistant Vice President 
(Defendant's Exhibit 19? T., 2/8/83 at 4-5; R. 500-501). 
The Bank counterclaimed seeking a judicial 
foreclosure of its Trust Deed and a determination that it is 
entitled to recover the costs and attorney's fees expended in 
defending against the Actions (Answer and Counterclaim; R. 
54-57) . In his Reply to the Counterclaim, Rothey pleaded the 
following two defenses: 
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a. That the Bankfs receipt of principal and 
interest precludes it from recovering attorney's fees and 
costs, (Reply to Counterclaim, Third and Fourth Defenses; R. 
80; Answers of Plaintiff to Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 7; R. 152-153)• 
b. That the Bank's failure to make a claim against 
the estate of Utahna Belnap for the costs and attorney's fees 
incurred while acting as Special Administrator of the estate 
bars its recovery of such costs and attorney's fees, (Reply 
to Counterclaim, Fifth and Sixth Defenses; R. 80-81). 
At trial, the parties agreed that their only 
dispute was over whether the Bank could in this action 
recover its costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending 
against the Actions, (T., 2/7/83, at 21; R. 393). After 
evidence had been introduced and testimony given, Rothey's 
counsel presented to the trial court "three theories that the 
Court has now heard something about which the Court could 
find that Walker Bank & Trust is simply not entitled to those 
fees." (T., 2/8/83, at 52; R. 548). 
The first theory was that the Bank is barred in 
this action under principles of res judicata from seeking its 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending against the 
Actions because the Bank should have requested such costs and 
attorney's fees in the Actions. (T., 2/8/83, at 52-72; R. 
548-568). This theory was not pleaded in Rothey's Reply to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Counterclaim and was presented over the Bank's objection, 
(See T., 2/8/83, at 91-92; R. 587-588) • Rothey's second 
theory corresponds to the Third and Fourth Defenses set out 
in his Reply to the Bank's counterclaim; that is, that the 
Bank's receipt of principal and interest due under the Note 
and Trust Deed precludes it from recovering attorney's fees. 
(T., 2/8/83, at 72-75; R. 568-571). Rothey's third and final 
theory was that the Actions did not attack the title to the 
Property or the interests of the Trustee, and that, 
consequently, the Bank could not recover its costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in defending against the Actions. 
(T., 2/8/83, at 75-76; R. 571-572). Rothey's counsel never 
argued or offered evidence upon any other theory or defense 
that would preclude the Bank's recovery of its costs and 
attorney's fees in the Actions. 
The trial court rendered its judgment from the 
bench. The trial court found every fact and element that was 
necessary for it to rule for the Bank. The trial court also 
rejected every theory or defense that Rothey had offered or 
argued. First, the trial court ruled that it did not have to 
address Rothey's res judicata theory because it had not been 
pleaded by Rothey. (T., 2/8/83, at 118; R. 614). Second, 
the trial court dispensed with Rothey's argument that the 
Bank's receipt of principal and interest precludes it from 
recovering attorney's fees. The court stated that "this is 
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not a case of accord and satisfaction . . • ." (T., 2/8/83, 
at 118; R. 614; see also Conclusion No. 8; R. 349). Finally, 
the trial court rejected Rothey's third theory by construing 
the Trust Deed to mean that "if they [the Bank] advance 
monies in behalf of the trustor, or if they elect in their 
own behalf to defend the sanctity or the sacredness of their 
security, that they may do so and charge those amounts 
against the trustor, and they thereby become secured by the 
trust deed document." (T., 2/8/83, at 119-120; R. 615-616; 
see also Conclusion No. 3; R. 347-348). In connection with 
this statement the trial court also found that the Actions 
were "either a direct or indirect attack . . . on either the 
i 
validity of the title of the reputed owner, Utahna Belnap, 
. . . or an attack on the integrity of the underlying 
security document, namely, the trust deed." (T., 2/8/83, at 
120-121; R. 616-617; see also, Finding No. 4; R. 341). The 
trial court accordingly concluded that the Bank's costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in defending against the Actions 
were recoverable under the Trust Deed. (Conclusion Nos. 3 
and 4; R. 347-348) . 
The trial court could, indeed should, have stopped 
at this point. All of the requirements for the Bank's 
recovery of its costs and attorney's fees had been found by 
the court. More importantly, all of Rothey's defenses had 
been rejected by the court. Since all defenses to the Bank's 
_ Q _ 
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counterclaim were cleared away, the trial court should have 
granted the counterclaim and allowed the Bank to recover its 
costs and attorney's fees as amounts secured by the Trust 
Deed* However, the trial court reached beyond the pleadings 
and beyond the record to make its final disposition. 
The trial court found that the Bank "failed to give 
LeGrande L. Belnap, or his successors or assigns, including 
Plaintiff herein, any meaningful or substantive notice that 
it had claimed, was claiming, or would claim the attorney's 
fees incurred in connection with [the Actions] as due and 
payable under the Trust Deed." (Conclusion No. 6; R. 348). 
From this finding, the court concluded that "[t]he bank is 
estopped by such failure to claim or collect the fees as a 
part of the foreclosure of the subject Trust Deed." 
(Conclusion No. 7; R. 348). 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court's judgment must be reversed because 
(i) the trial court's own rulings entitle the Bank to recover 
the disputed costs and attorney's fees; (ii) the sole basis 
for the judgment was neither pleaded nor argued by Rothey; 
(iii) the trial court's holding requiring that the Bank give 
Rothey notice of its claiming attorney's fees is contrary to 
the law, (iv) ino evidence supports the dispositive factual 
findings of the trial court relating to that holding; and (v) 
even assuming the correctness of the trial court's theory, 
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other essential factual elements of estoppel were neither 
proved nor found by the trial court. Each point will be 
addressed in turn, 
POINT I 
BASED UPON THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS, 
THE BANK IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE 
DISPUTED FEES AND EXPENSES. 
In its Counterclaim in this action, the Bank prayed 
for the following: (i) that the court determine the amount 
due under the Note and secured by the Trust Deed, including 
costs and attorney's fees incurred by the Bank, and (ii) that 
the Trust Deed be foreclosed to satisfy said amount. (R. 56-
57). The trial court found each and every element that was 
necessary for it to grant the relief prayed for in the Bank's 
Counterclaim. First, the trial court found that Utahna 
Belnap executed and delivered the Note and executed, 
acknowledged and delivered the Trust Deed to the Bank. * 
(Finding No. 1; R. 340-341). Second, the trial court 
concluded that the Trust Deed is a valid and enforceable 
first lien and encumbrance against the Property. (Conclusion * 
No. 1; R. 347). Third, the trial court found that the Trust 
Deed allows the Bank, as Trustee and Beneficiary, to appear 
in and defend any action purporting to affect the security of i 
the Trust Deed, the title to the Property, or the rights and 
powers of the Bank under the Trust Deed. (Conclusion No. 3; 
R. 347-348). Fourth, the trial court determined that costs 1 
- 1 0 - M 
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and attorney's fees expended by the Bank in defending such 
actions are secured by the Trust Deed, (Id,). Fifthf the 
trial court concluded that the Actions were both either a 
direct or indirect attack on either the validity of title to 
the Property or on the validity of the Trust Deed. 
(Conclusion No. 4? R. 348). Sixth, the trial court found 
that the Bank appeared in and defended against the Actions 
and expended attorney's fees in so defending. (Finding No. 
*5j R» 348) . Seventh, the trial court found that none of the 
scheduled payments due under the Note were made between 
February, 1976 and July, 1981 — the Bank did not commence 
trustee's sale proceedings under the Trust Deed until the 
Note had been in default for more than five years. (Finding 
No. 17; R. 346) . 
In short, the Bank succeeded in establishing to the 
trial court's satisfaction a prima facie case entitling it to 
recover the disputed attorney's fees under the Trust Deed. 
Every single fact and element that the Bank was required to 
prove was proved by the Bank and the trial court's findings 
and conclusions so state. Absent an effective affirmative 
defense by Rothey, the trial court should have proceeded to 
determine the amount of costs and attorney's fees incurred by 
the Bank in defending against the Actions and to decreed the 
foreclosure of the Trust Deed to recover those costs and 
fees. The trial court rejected all of Rothey's defenses. 
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As will be shown below, the theory of defense adopted by the 
trial court was neither pleaded nor argued by Rothey, is not 
supported by the evidence, and is contrary to law. Because 
the Bank has established its case, because the trial court 
rejected all of Rothey's defenses, and because the defense 
created by the trial court cannot be sustained, the trial 
court should be reversed and this case should be remanded for 
a determination of the amount of fees and costs due the Bank 
under the Trust Deed and further proceedings to foreclose the 
Trust Deed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS 
RULING ON AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
NEITHER PLEADED NOR ARGUED BY ROTHEY. 
Rothey's Reply to the Bank's Counterclaim seeking 
judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed, and inclusion of the 
disputed attorney's fees in the amount secured by the Trust 
Deed, raised only the following two affirmative defenses: 
(i) that because the Bank has accepted the payment of all 
principal and interest owed under the Trust Deed, it is 
precluded from proceeding to foreclose the Trust Deed to 
recover its costs and attorney's fees (Reply to Counterclaim, 
Third and Fourth Defenses; R. 80; see also Answers of 
Plaintiff to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, Nos. 6 
and 7; R. 152-153), and (ii) that the Bank, as Special 
Administrator of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap, was entitled 
_ T) _ 
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to seek payment for all services rendered in that capacity as 
a part of that probate proceeding and that due to the Bank's 
failure to apply for such payment it is estopped from seeking 
those fees as part of the foreclosure of the Trust Deed, 
(Reply to Counterclaim, Fifth and Sixth Defense, R. 80-81? 
see also Answers of Plaintiff to Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories, Nos. 8 and 9; R. 153-54). 
It is true that in his Fourth Defense to the Bank's 
Counterclaim, Rothey pleaded generally that the Bank is 
"estopped" to claim the subject costs and attorney's fees. 
(R. 80). When asked by interrogatory what facts supported 
that Fourth Defense, however, Rothey stated only that the 
Bank failed to request payment for costs and attorney's fees 
in the probate proceeding. (Answers of Plaintiff to 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, No. 7; R. 153). At 
no time prior to the trial court's announcement of its 
judgment did the Bank receive notice that anyone was placing 
reliance on a theory that the Bank is estopped by its failure 
to advise Rothey that it would claim the subject costs and 
fees * 
Both at trial and in defending against the Bank's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment during the month prior to 
trial, Rothey argued only the following three theories: (i) 
that the Bank is barred by res judicata from claiming the 
disputed attorney's fees because the Bank had failed to claim 
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them in connection with the Actions (T., 2/8/83, at 52-72; R. 
548-568; R. 253-259); (ii) that the Bank had waived any right 
to claim the disputed attorney's fees by accepting payment of 
principal and interest due under the Note (T., 2/8/83, at 72-
75; R. 568-571; R. 259-263); and (iii) that the Actions did 
not challenge title to the Property and that, therefore, the 
Bank's expenses incurred in defending against the actions 
were not recoverable under the terms of the Trust Deed (T., 
2/8/83, at 75-76; R. 571-572; R. 252-253). 
The trial court rejected each and every one of 
Rothey's arguments. The trial court found specifically (i) 
that res judicata was inapplicable; (ii) that the Bank did 
not waive its right to claim attorney's fees by accepting 
payment of principal and interest due under the Note 
(Conclusion No. 8; R. 349); and (iii) that the Bank's 
Res judicata was not pleaded by Rothey in his Reply to the 
Bank's Counterclaim. The Bank's counsel objected to any 
evidence offered to support this affirmative defense. (T., 
2/8/83, at 92-93; R. 588-580). Under Rule 8(c), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the plea of res judicata must be pleaded 
affirmatively, and if not so interposed is waived. See Board 
of County Commissioners v. City and County of Denver, 547 
P.2d 249, 251 (Colo. 1976). The lower court ultimately 
agreed with the Bank: 
"[T]his is not a case of res judicata, 
there having been no affirmative defense 
raised and the Court not having received 
a motion nor granted a motion about res 
judicata." 
(T., 2/8/83, at 118; R. 614). 
_ 1 A _ 
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expenses incurred in the Actions were recoverable by the 
terms of the Trust Deed (Conclusions No, 3 and 4; R. 347-
348) • 
Two glaring and dispositive facts emerge from the 
foregoing review of the pleadings, arguments and ruling in 
this case. First, the trial court rejected explicitly each 
and every defense that was either pleaded or argued by 
Rothey. Second, and this fact emerges inescapably from the 
first, Rothey never pleaded nor did he ever argue that the 
Bank had a duty to give LeGrande L. Belnap, or his successors 
or assigns, including Rothey, meaningful or substantive 
notice that it was claiming the attorney's fees incurred in 
defending against the Actions, (Conclusion No. 6, R. 348; 
T., 2/8/83, at 125, R. 621), neither did Rothey ever plead or 
argue that the Bank's breach of such duty estopped it from 
recovering the disputed attorney's fees. The trial court's 
reliance on this unpleaded and unargued defense, of which the 
Bank had absolutely no notice, is plain reversible error. 
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
as follows: 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a 
party shall set forth affirmatively 
. . . estoppel . . . , and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense* 
Plainly, Rothey8s Reply to the Bank's Counterclaim is the 
type of "pleading to a preceding pleading" contemplated by 
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Rule 8(c). See Resources Engineering, Inc. v. Siler, 94 
Idaho 935, 500 P.2d 836 (1972); Bowers v. Edwards, 79 Nev. 
384, 385 P.2d 783 (1963). Just as clearly, the trial court's 
theory that (i) the Bank had a duty to keep the Trustor under 
the Trust Deed advised of the Bank's expenses incurred in 
defending against the action and (ii) that the Bank's breach 
of that duty estops the Bank from claiming such expenses, 
must be affirmatively pleaded under Rule 8(c) as "estoppel 
[or] any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
2 
affirmative defense." Rothey's failure to plead estoppel 
based on the Bank's breach of its purported duty to inform 
the Trustor of the disputed attorney's fees precluded the 
2 
"A general and almost universal 
identifying criterion of an affirmative 
defense is one in avoidance, or stated 
alternatively a direct or implicit 
admission of plaintiff's claim and 
assertion of other facts which would 
defeat a right to recovery." 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963, 965 
(Wyo. 1973). See Roberts v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 289 
Or. 119, 611 P.2d 297, 301 (1980). The theory invented by 
the trial court falls well within this definition of the 
phrase "any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense" in Rule 8(c). The trial court found 
that the Bank was entitled to the disputed attorney's fees 
under the terms of the Trust Deed, but that the Bank's breach 
of its duty to keep the Trustor advised of such fees estopped 
the Bank from recovering them. 
- 1 £ -
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trial court from relying on such a theory to dispose of this 
case. 
Rothey's Reply to the Bank's Counterclaim did 
utilize the word "estopped*" (Reply to Counterclaim, Fourth, 
Fifth and Sixth Defenses; R. 80). Rothey's answers to the 
Bank's interrogatories, however, make clear that Rothey did 
not plead or intend to assert the estoppel theory adopted by 
the lower court. The "estoppel" pleaded in Rothey's Reply 
tothe Bank's Counterclaim referred only to the following! 
(a) that the Bank's acceptance of principal and 
interest due under the Note and Trust Deed "estopped" it from 
claiming the disputed attorney's fees. (Answers of Plaintiff 
to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, Nos. 7, 8 and 9; 
R. 153-154), and 
(b) that the Bank, "as special administrator of 
the estate of Utahna P. Belnap, was entitled to seek the 
payment for all services rendered in that capacity as a part 
of said proceeding. By reason of the fact that [the Bank] 
failed to make application for reimbursement for all services 
rendered as part of this proceeding [the Bank] is thereby 
estopped from seeking those fees as part of the foreclosure 
of the subject Trust Deed." (_Id.) (Emphasis added). 
Most persuasively, however, Rothey's counsel, in 
argument at trial and in defending against the Bank's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment in the month prior to trial, 
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never stated or even hinted that Rothey asserted any defense, 
estoppel, or theory based upon the Bank's failure to advise 
the Trustor or her successor of the Bank's claims for 
expenses and attorney's fees. (R. 248-271; T. 2/8/83, at 50-
81, 111-118; R. 546-577, 607-614). 
Rothey simply never pleaded the estoppel theory 
adopted by the trial court,, Consequently, Rothey could not 
rely on that theory and the trial court erred in adopting it. 
The law is clear that estoppel must be pleaded with 
particularity, and pleading one kind of estoppel does not 
permit proof of another. Kirk v. Kirk, 205 Okla. 482, 238 
P.2d 808, 810 (1951); In re Anderson's Estate, 121 Mont. 515, 
194 P.2d 621, 626-627 (1948). As this Court stated in Tracy 
Loan & Trust Co. v. Qpenshaw Investment Co., 102 Utah 509, 
132 P.2d 388, 391 (1942), "Where a party seeks to raise an 
estoppel to a claim set forth in the pleadings, facts 
constituting an estoppel must be pleaded." (Emphasis added). 
See also Collett v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 231 P.2d 730, 733 
(1951). The only facts pleaded by Rothey with respect to 
estoppel concerned the Bank's acceptance of principal and 
interest due under the Note and Trust Deed and costs and 
expenses incurred by the Bank in connection with probate of 
the estate of Utahna P. Belnap. No facts were ever pleaded 
or presented at trial which constituted the estoppel found by 
the trial court. 
_ i Q _ 
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In this state as in others, theories of estoppel or 
avoidance and affirmative defenses must be affirmatively 
pleaded or they are waived. In Collett v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 
662, 231 P.2d 730 (1951), for example, the Court stated "the 
majority view [which] requires a party who has the 
opportunity to do so to specially plead an equitable 
estoppel. Where the estoppel is not pleaded, it is 
inadmissible." 231 P.2d, at 733. The court quoted the 
following from Homberger v. Alexander, 11 Utah 363, 40 P. 
260, 262 (1895) as the obvious reason for the rule: "The 
object of the declaration is to give the defendant fair 
notice of the case he is called into court to meet." So 
here, counsel for the Bank prepared for trial unaware that he 
would be called upon to rebut the novel theory eventually 
adopted by the trial court. Indeed, since the theory adopted 
by the trial court was neither raised in Rothey's pleadings 
nor argued at or prior to trial, counsel for the Bank was not 
even called upon to rebut or offer evidence as to that 
theory. As will be more fully explained in the following 
sections of this Brief, counsel for Rothey was similarly 
caught off guard by the trial court's creative jurisprudence 
—— Rothey's counsel neither pleaded, argued nor produced any 
evidence to support the trial court's theory. 
The trial court's error in adopting a theory of 
estoppel that was neither pleaded nor argued below requires 
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reversal of its judgment and a remand for a hearing to 
determine the appropriate amount of costs and attorney's fees 
that the Bank is entitled to under the Trust Deed. Maxey v. 
Jefferson County School District, 158 Colo. 583, 408 P.2d 970 
(1965) , is instructive in this regard. Plaintiff in that 
case sought a retroactive pay increase based upon certain 
teacher salary schedules. The case was tried and the trial 
court thereafter dismissed the complaint on the grounds of 
laches and estoppel since the plaintiff had neither 
complained about nor sought to enforce payment of the salary 
differential. In reversing the trial court's dismissal of 
the complaint, the Colorado Supreme Court noted the 
following: 
Although defendant's Answer admits the 
employment and denies the claimed 
coverage, yet it fails affirmatively to 
plead laches or estoppel as required by 
Rule 8(c), R.C.P. Colo. 
Nor does this record show any waiver 
by plaintiff in error of her right to 
object to defendant raising these issues 
at a later time. In this connection, the 
record discloses that such defenses were 
first urged upon the court orally at 
trial. Not having been pled, as 
required, we hold that the trial court 
erred in considering such defenses, 
especially over the objections of counsel 
for plaintiff in error. 
408 P.2d, at 971. 
The facts of the instant case are, of course, even 
more egregious than those which prompted the reversal in 
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M a x e ^ . in I In ill fi'vise ,  l:!;,ie par \ ) benefi tt i nq From t he estoppel 
theory ultimately relied on by the trial court at least 
presented such theory to the court at trial 0 Here, in 
contrast ,, Rothey ne i t her p ! eaded nor argued the estoppel 
theory uti 1i zed by the trial court • The Bank was 
consequently never accorded any opportunity to re&oon.; even 
after the cl ose of the evidence , to si ich theory. As cne 
Court stated :i n Lagoon Co, v. Utah State 1 'air Association, 
117 Utah 213, 214 P. 2d 61 4, 61 6 (1950),, " [t]he c ^ u * of 
estoppel must fai ] because of the lack: of plead I O Q S and 
evidence to allege and show such a defense•" 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED itf HOLDIMG THAT 
THE BANK HAD A DUTY TO GIVE 
NOTICE OF THE DISPUTED ATTORNEY'S 
FEES TO THE TRUSTOR AND HER SUCCESSORS. 
without M/ainino I: v the t > tr*\ court JS contrary ta law '" • e 
•rial court- ^ u; e-1 that *• hf BanK was ^.stopped from claiming 
purported uo.jt:v" <. o ^ e ^ :•<=- 'l rust, or inder r --*? Irosr ^ ~?d 
"meaninqfal J ^lbstanti^p notice that i\ ic*d claimed, was 
. s. <* x m i nu \ - .. i *y . ! 
'Concl us. -"> . <4^, ,..M 2 :> 8 3, ^L « ,I > v. Jl) . 
NM , such out y exis's in t ;R~ I .-j w it » -J d L i t i cu 1 t o o , sprove 
u< >^:<-r -K * '-erri.js^  r . !- • Rothey nor the 
t.uai com i offered .ii,y authority to* its existence. 
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Rothey's failure in this regard is understandable since he 
never pleaded or argued for the imposition of such a duty. 
As the trial court expressly concluded, the Trust 
Deed allows the Bank to defend against actions like the 
Actions and to add costs incurred in such defense to the 
amount secured by the Trust Deed. (Conclusions Nos. 3 and 4; 
R. 347-348). The relationship between the Trustor and its 
successors and the Bank that is established by the Trust Deed 
with respect to such costs is that of, or closely analogous 
to, indemnitor (the Trustor) and indemnitee (the Bank). As 
was stated in Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 119 
Cal. Rptr. 449, 532 P.2d 97, 100 (1975): "Indemnity may be 
defined as the obligation resting on one party to make good a 
loss or damage another party has incurred." 
The trial court's imposition of a duty on the Bank, 
as indemnitee, to notify the Trustor or its successor, as 
indemnitor, of expenses incurred in defending against the 
actions is contrary to the law of those jurisdictions that 
have addressed this issue. The general rule is that unless 
specifically required by the terms of the indemnification 
agreement itself, an indemnitee has no duty to notify his 
indemnitor that he is incurring expenses for which the 
indemnitor may ultimately be liable. 
In Boston and Maine Railroad v. Bethlehem Steel 
Co., 311 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1963), plaintiff-railroad 
- 22 -
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. nt . M * -M. . 
iPtnj.eht,; i^ ,..c.M . .,..««.!. . ; * .a . ! o-jj i D[ ui.y 4-.* , or 
damage arising oat .)f th* lailroad s Operation of the spur. 
A bethi<=!t. - - . - - ' • * ,: >d 
railroa *, j., ^. .,., ; iea bethietie'h „ .,u *u, ur 
* J «1 "V.'t ^ tempi • u vc • <- Bethieneir ieienr 'he suit "'-
railroad settU-1 — •> -<-'e auu l^ ck----? e^M~,leberr r~r 
ijeni.,:' 'ir. *.• . •. . hem res is,-J [ . 41 ouw«o ' "lat it 
shouli h^*~ been ecu led on ! •> defend * he su1:., The court 
disagreed wit>> Bethlehem, stating: 
Unless tne indemnity agreement so 
specifies, neither Massachusetts, nor any 
other, court that we have been able r<-
discover, requires an indemnitee to 
notify an indemnitor to come in and 
defendo Indeed, he need not even give 
notice of the claim. 
311 F. 2<5
 k ~u 8 49 .'emphasis added). 
v
'^<-> court, in T i L i_man . , wnea 1. on - Haven Kec r eat i on 
Association, • - f -4th C \ r .  *^7H'. a] so states the 
general r-ile as Loiiuw;?: 
We know ;>f >;. authority to suppot t the 
proposition that notice to a primary 
obligor of the basic claimf and an 
invitation to defend the same, is a 
condition precedent to the obligation of 
a primary obligor to indemnify a 
secondary obligorf who has paid tne basic 
claim,. 
rS8<» P. 2d, ;M \2iQ< 
Fc^jni-ci wUi p . . r.-conOjini(_ Rcsenri : : ; -inc* i_ysts * -w 
. * ^u '.^ u 4t;,. C i r
 fc ;**"*• *^ S U M ] i r l \ i n s t r u c t i v e . 
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Plaintiff, an issuer of securities, sued a broker for 
indemnification. Plaintiff and the broker had agreed that 
the broker would sell certain of plaintiff's investment 
contracts. The broker promised to abide by applicable 
securities laws and agreed to indemnify plaintiff in the 
event that the broker violated such laws. The broker sold 
some of the investment contracts in a state, North Carolina, 
in which the offering was not registered. North Carolina 
threatened to indict plaintiff but agreed to forestall 
indictment in return for plaintiff's reimbursement of all 
buyers in the state. Plaintiff paid out a substantial sum 
and looked to the broker for indemnification. The broker 
defended on the ground that he had not been notified of 
plaintiff's settlement with the state. The court rejected 
the brokers argument, stating: 
Nor is [plaintiff's] claim barred by the 
absence of formal notice to the broker 
that [plaintiff] was required to rescind 
the sales to North Carolina residents. 
Although no North Carolina precedent 
dealing precisely with this issue has 
been called to our attention, we believe 
that the state's Supreme Court would 
adhere to the general rule that notice is 
unnecessary unless the contract of 
indemnity requires it. 
578 F.2d, at 554. 
As these cases make clear, an indemnitee is not 
under any duty, absent a contrary indication in the indemnity 
agreement, to notify his indemnitor of claims that may bind 
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t h e J r,d» T - ' - Y"- V1 •. • t * . . ., *k. - i 
prov'isi, . i-w t...^. -. / i H M W, ,.^I ,.^  . .M- Trustor . i. che 
«vent the Bc*nk exercises K S ri.^in to defend against attacks 
" ^ e ~ cast ueeOo * -" : * f" ^ * f ^ 1 
court -  assumption,. .  ,v. v . < >>c .. ^it. .oi-orni t .-^  
Trustor " • Lot subject attorney s rer . . 
B e s i d e s *:«-* -'»; 7^n*T'r ' * ne idw un " : s i s s u e f 
T i , -. "* . .* estoppp.. ,eorv 
create ***• t v tri-*l ootir1 is both ill-founded and almost 
universal IP its appl nation - - •-* iangerous combination. 
••*- "icu* ^*^n ^ . - i.-, • ,« :rustor sha] ] pay certai n 
attorney s fe^s ami expenses incurred by the Beneficiary is 
not in principle different than any party's agreement i n any 
^n* r ,.- - •-,:* .- j.-- .-MM i,«r't ^ prescrj bed expenses that 
ftidy be incur ted over tune. The unprecedented "duty" created 
'v the t. r - a i oour** reqmt^s that 3ny party to such a contract 
fvsf es* -*j • s - ^"i>i • t...-} ;?r^'edent to i:ecovei:y,,. 11 :iat 1: ie 
) a s given t.he responsible* party , Emeaningful" and 
''substantive" notice thaf ***d :laimed, was claiming, or 
agreed t- ieimburse. Just a few ot Llie tesuJts of th^t 
preposterous principle are offered as examples: 
j.« Ail -ont' i:" ' - .-or: frj J n ; nq rj pnivpnarrl that «"> r i e 
party will pay spec i i. i ^ o expenses ot another party are 
as i matter of Jaw supplemented by an unwritten 
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condition precedent to recovery that the party seeking 
reimbursement must give the other party "meaningful" and 
"substantive" notice of the claim for reimbursement as 
reimbursable expenses are incurred an obligation for 
which the parties did not contract, to which the parties 
did not agree, and over which the parties have no 
control. The trial court's theory imposes a material 
provision in all contracts, which the parties never 
considered and to which the parties never agreed. 
2. If the party entitled to reimbursement cannot 
locate the responsible party to give him notice, the 
party's contractual right to reimbursement is 
extinguished. 
3. In every lawsuit where such damages are sought, 
the party entitled to reimbursement must not only prove 
his entitlement to damages and the amount thereof, he 
must also prove that he gave the other party 
"meaningful" and "substantive" notice of his damages as 
they were incurred a fact-intensive finding that 
will practically eliminate the possibility of summary 
judgment in such contract cases and will complicate and 
protract all contract trials. 
4. If this Court adopts the trial court's theory, 
this Court can reasonably expect an avalanche of 
litigation directed at the nature, form, content, 
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such ease.-., rue new :ie f\-:nse of; insufficient form, 
content, frequency <-•* timeliness of; n^tjce of : :i-
defense in contract actions* 
5. In cases wheie ^t:touieyr,s t ees are - r)*~ >m for 
rei ill:;;)! irsement (iii im a] 1 *^ - *'•*' , * -.. - n I y 
is entitled to recover r. attorney & tees , tne j. -ar ty 
claiming recovery iitus meaningful i y n advise tus 
oppone n t o f h i s a 11 o i: - < 
thereby giving to his opponent informed.on as to the 
amount of time being expended and the economic b in den r.o 
which the claimant is bei ng subjected in the ijtigati on 
- — otherwise cont K Jen t ial information rnat r ^  -i orient 
can .j«e t-> his strategic advantage :• n settlement 
discussior ^ ; ' otherwise* 
. , - . *< ' ,»uioeent parties ^hn are 
entitled
 t .-i damages w.il be deprived *t the,? iiu«- ~-\ 
hyper t^chn i crs I pr i nr c;%- »'M* t iw- =*v^.<*qer reasonable 
pej v, ^ .".II. > <- «-• • > ft; • < .-* i j ;^  c t.hey' s 
counsel, for example, who 's pia nly rjoir* and was 
motivated to avoid payment here, never conceived of this 
pjr . •-*. i p i e . 
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The trial court's theory, being both devoid of 
support in the law and lacking in logic or common sense, must 
be rejected. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE BANK FAILED TO NOTIFY THE 
TRUSTOR OF THE DISPUTED ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Assuming that the trial court properly considered 
its "estoppel" theory despite Rothey's failure to plead it 
and that the trial court properly held that the Bank had a 
duty to notify the Trustor or its successor of its attorney's 
fees despite the fact that the law states plainly that no 
such duty exists, the fact remains that no evidence produced 
at trial supports either (i) the finding that the Bank 
breached the asserted "duty" or (ii) the finding that the 
Trustor or her successor relied to his or her detriment upon 
that breach. 
A. No Evidence Supports the Finding that 
the Bank Failed to Apprise the Trustor or 
her Successor of the Bank's Claim to or 
Magnitude of Attorney's Fees. 
The finding which supports the trial court's 
estoppel theory was first stated by the district court as 
follows: 
That none of the statements [reflecting 
the disputed attorney's fees] were ever 
delivered to or shown to Utahna P. 
Belnap, LeGrande L. Belnap or any of 
their successors or assigns. The Court 
specifically finds that neither Plaintiff 
nor anyone claiming by, through or under 
him had knowledge of the nature, extent 
or amount of the attorney's fees being 
paid by the bank, nor were any such Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
persons given an opp<irt.*w. ., ~. . _:-*v£W 
such statements or fees at i-he tune tr>e% 
were incurred or within -* ledsoridble time 
thereafter. 
(r-rn, r.
 v , liS. ^tter counsel for the Bank 
protested that there was no evidence °o support: this finding, 
the trial co^rr- -^ende^ \ i *; finding u i follows-
'rMrtr d u ci i.ue statements were addressed 
to and received by the bank and there is 
no evidence that any of the statements 
were delivered to or shown to Utahna P. 
Belnap, LeGrande Belnap or any of their 
successors or assigns including 
plaintiff. The Court: therefore 
specifically finds that there were no 
meaningful or substantive discussions 
between the bank, or any of its agents, 
and the Plaintiff or anyone claiming by, 
through or under him concerning the 
amount or nature of the attorneyfs fees 
which the bank intended to charge as a 
part of : he Ttust Deed. 
(Finding i^  ' i; tf UV- • fcmpns -> i < added), 
•<-* • ed lis*"11] f and, instead of 
finding that the statements were not delivered to the 
Trustor* finally foinvi >. n^t ih^ r.-> ***-- ?y^ .•=- J I dence" that the 
:
 .:. -&me-- • •••••• • . -ip^f commendaoie 
t. na* the iiidl couic was candid M> r.h±$ regard* But, of 
course, 'he fact thai, there was no evidence that any 
statements W H H J de. : W-M <-^  * : • * > r . •• s .* . • I; lie 
necessary finding .icir r.hefe ^ s JIG evidence that such 
statements were not delivered. The U W K of evidence as to 
del; very O'J non-dei i \. <-r . - i '".v ^I;H t criu/ni - -• -*••••' - j r f- r .^, t- . 
-,-.i.iey n.?c no incentive. i:u produce such evidence because he 
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had neither pleaded nor argued any legal theory that relied 
on such evidence. Similarlyf the Bank presented no evidence 
concerning delivery of the statements to the Trustor or her 
successors because such evidence did not affect either its 
claim to foreclose the Trust Deed or Rothey's defenses to 
that claim. 
As has already been discussed, neither the "duty" 
first conceived by the trial court nor the estoppel that 
supposedly follows from a breach of that duty was either 
pleaded or argued by Rothey. The trial transcript in this 
case can be searched in vainf therefore, for any discussion 
of, or evidence relating to, such a "duty" or estoppel. A 
synopsis of the evidence offered and the testimony taken, 
however, reveals just how far the trial court was stretching 
to find factual support for its unprecedented theory. 
Rothey himself was the first witness. He testified 
that he was involved in both of the Actions as counsel to 
LeGrande Belnap. (T., 2/7/83, at 27-33; R. 401-405). In 
light of this clear testimony, it is difficult to understand 
the trial court's finding that the Trustor under the Trust 
Deed or her successor was unaware of the Bank's efforts in 
defending against the Actions. Rothey jjs the successor to 
the Trustor and has been since January 13, 1978. (Verified 
Complaint, Paragraph 12; R. 4). Prior to that time, Rothey 
acted as counsel to the Trustor's successor. Rothey even 
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t€ S t I f 1 ^ :"':.-;' ,
 :* v . . c. •-, - . H-. - f ^ > 
relation i.o i. he Actions was spec i i ica i i y brouqht Lo hir 
attention. (T., 2/7/83, at 32; R . 404). •• 
• I'anies Lowr i e
 r one of t! le attorney a who represented 
the Bank in its defense against the Actions, was the next 
witness '\ . . 2-'' -8.i, it 36-120| * n)8- 4 9 1 — Mr., L o w n e 
1
 H ^ 1*1- • . - - > . , silts 0 * r^r---' 
Bank to -».«ppwt r. I L •> c j -, i .t; : , • ue -i i spaced attorney * s : t-Hb 
RotheyS ;:uunse] qiky, i -nr., * i,owr>e extensively as *o 
-•:--•: - ; i i :i i: :t thei r enti rety i 
• . the Air ions whether nsev irn*l-iiied attorney's fees for 
other matters is wfi., *; L o w n e was never asked, and never 
'i\ c*t &S . *l &* - - * \ *w i iiiii rommuni cated w:i th 
-we Irus;. L w*-.-* L .-,:•» p^c :. :..^  i-u;. BonK's defense of the Actions 
-:*r the amc ;• -f attorne*,-'.-: lees J ncurred as a result. 
:: - r •< i • • ^  ? . - - :ness Mr Clark in, i s 
employe.; .
 : ..it- Bo^k -,-w \ - -,: 4 •; .e., at* .*at the Note, ;c .. e*ed 
^nd t.-Ae B^nK'-i acceptance ^r the principal and :nr.eres+ iue 
thereunder " 9 u J , r- • • 'J f;';*[ -^09) . 
1
 • - .^. • • . < f ^ - >• !•- v -r i: i j then 
t e s t i f i e d .*s t o a t t o r n e y ' s i;ees Mjcur^ed h e r e i n , ( T . , 
2 / 8 / 8 3 , a t 14- T.4 ? *. 5 1 0- 520) . 
Wo* ^u- ,. . :, f ' . < - i j
 ( , - 1 j - • > ! . ; . - A* ! V - ~- I , 
2 / 3 / 3 3 , 3{ . ; 4 - 4 4 ; - . S ^ 0 - S 4 ' * ' . H i s c u u n s e ; i n q u i r e d a s t o 
i j i s f e e s c t i a r g e d w i t h r e g a r d to t h e A c t i o n s . 
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Kay Lewis was then called. He testified as to a 
"typical" attorney's fee for a trustee's sale. (T., 2/8/83, 
at 44-49; R. 540-545) . 
The foregoing summary makes clear that there was no evidence 
offered on the issue whether the Bank gave its counsel's 
statements to Rothey or his predecessors. 
Since estoppel is an affirmative defense, its 
proponent, Rothey, has the burden of proving it. Corporation 
Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 420 (1973). No 
evidence having been offered on the issue, the defense fails. 
Taken as a whole, however, the undisputed evidence 
establishes that Rothey and his predecessors knew that the 
Bank claimed an entitlement to recover the subject fees and 
were advised of the amount thereof. That the Bank claimed 
the right to recover such fees is plainly spelled out in 
paragraph 4 of the Trust Deed itself (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2), 
which was a matter of public record and was the very object 
of dispute in the Actions. Rothey testified that during his 
representation of LeGrande Belnap in the Actions, he had 
occasion to discuss settlement with the Bank's counsel 
"several times." (T., 2/7/83, at 31-32; R. 403-404). As 
Rothey stated: 
The settlement always involved the 
question of the trust deed as it affected 
the property which Mr. Belnap claimed 
title to and it always involved the 
propriety of attorney's fees growing out 
of Walker Bank's defense of any claims 
that Mr. Belnap had raised against them. 
- -*? -
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('I' ,
 tl /,/ } / H * ^' v;» " i , .iM-d \ . : • . . 
i ^  addition to advice received .:];riag settlement; 
discussions, Rothey va,> advised of the dino^u of attor'^,y's 
fees t hpn ^^uiuv • .t K.; . • , - • • r> '-i i? 
;i.dim^ d fne fees in question i\> pleadings -t the ActJOrs. 
The Bank's Amended Counterclaim ±n one of uhe Actions alleges 
That the plaintiff in this action by the • 
filing of this Complaint in this action 
and in the case of LeGrande L. Belnap v. 
Walker Bank and Trust Company, et al», 
Civil No* 209266, and the prosecution of 
said complaints caused defendant and 
counterclaimant to incur fees, costs and 
expenses including attorney's fees in 
excess of $10,000.00 in defense of the 
validity of said Trust Deed and 
Promissory Note, which sum constitutes 
interest in and lien upon the property 
sought- t-o be foreclosed her*nnde* . 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Sx 1 • 7-'83t <*t M. •< . \Hh * ^he 
amended '"'Mntercla im ^ -^ r <-»< ei <•>-'«-
^58-55' wtney tneretoxe knnw durjn.^ i:h%- course of t >e 
Actions that * ne M *:-.•« -jn incurred aivi claimed ^ *. at 
least $10,000.'W in fees and expenses. Finall --.-u-- • f hey 
* . - * • /' / - * i 4 *t -J i J n d t- t-%K j . i di ^  >;" M ^  i . r i S „ ':t .-.'•• , S 
c i i e n t ) o J D v i o o s i y hciti f i r s t h a n d k n o w l e d g e •; f t h e B a n k ' -
rounsei '-- efforts md ^CM MI i t; i es in *^-^ '?ndiMq aqamst Lne 
ifK- evidence outlined above is f^ e only evidence at 
trial that bears on whether Rothey or his predecessor knew of 
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the Bank's claim to attorney's fees. That evidence 
establishes that Rothey and his predecessors did know of the 
Bank's claim to the fees in question, did know of an exact 
amount of fees claimed by the Bank on at least one occasion, 
and did "several times" during settlement discussions discuss 
attorney's fees incurred by the Bank in the Actions. There 
was no evidence that further "meaningful" and "substantive" 
discussions did not occur. No evidence supports the trial 
court's finding to the contrary on an issue upon which Rothey 
had the burden of proof. The trial court's finding of 
insufficient notice cannot be sustained. 
B. The Trial Court did not Find, and No 
Evidence Supports, the Existence of 
Detrimental Reliance, an Essential 
Ingredient of Estoppel. 
Even if there was evidence to support the finding 
that the Bank failed to inform the Trustor of the disputed 
attorney's fees, there was no evidence that the Trustor or 
her successors relied on such failure. Indeed, the trial 
court failed to even make a finding as to reliance. Since 
reliance is an essential element of equitable estoppel under 
Utah law, the trial Court's "estoppel" theory fails. 
In Jones v. Department of Employment Security, 641 
P.2d 156, 161 (Utah 1982), this Court set out the following: 
Elements of equitable estoppel are as 
follows: conduct by one party which 
leads another party, in reliance thereon, 
to adopt a course of action resulting in 
detriment or damage if the first party is 
- 1A -
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permitted tt* cepu -
(Emphasis added) • 
Leavei -. ui^ose , -: • -" '!-' - \ "- \ -.^n L^UU; IS also 
instructive. This Ooutt. L^is.ec Ltwre: 
'The doctrine o.t estoppel has application 
when one, by his acts, representations, 
or conduct, or by his silence when he 
ought to speak, induces another to 
believe certain facts exist and such 
other relies thereon to his detriment. 
(Emphasis added). 
See also Celebrity Club v._Utah L i quor Contro1 Commissioner , 
602 p.2d 689, 694 (01ah 1 9 7 9 ) . 
.As these cases make clear, even :i £ (i) Rothey had 
p] eaded the tria] court' s estoppel theory1",. ( i i ) the ] aw 
» sed upo n the Bank a c!u ty to i n f o rii ti le Ftus toi: o f tl :ie 
disputed attorney's fees, and (iii) there was evidence that 
-
 !
^e Bank had breached said duty f the tri a] court shou] d sti"1 1 
be reversed because :l t fai ] ed to fi i Id that the I"i: i istoi: relied 
on such a breach to his detriment and because there is no 
evidence *-o support ^irh * h n d m q The r^^^r-i -^ r. ie 
predecessors )n interest would have acted ?ny dittetent] y 
than they did had the n^nu notified them of irs claims and 
evidence of su«:-; lelia^oe <Jte essential elements of- v> 
estoppel tneoi w Since there is neither any £ indicia nor any 
' ' 5 H l ] f ' • ' . „ . - ' , | , , ^ s T U - i i > f u - t" I u t i t r f i t *•* I r : j j . '• , 
*•*.: t t i J . ' U u i * Jt Ud-JI l icrn . i-iu&: -•* ( . e v e r b W , 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment cannot be sustained and 
must be reversed for six independently sufficient reasons: 
First, the trial court found every fact necessary to support 
the Bank's recovery of its attorney's fees and costs incurred 
in the Actions. Second, the trial court expressly rejected 
each defense advanced by Rothey. Third, the trial court 
based its ruling upon a defense and theory that was never 
pleaded or argued by Rothey and of which the Bank had 
absolutely no notice. Fourth, the trial court's theory is 
contrary to law and good sense. Fifth, no evidence supports 
the finding, essential to the trial court's dispositive 
theory, that the Bank failed timely to advise Rothey or his 
predecessors that it claimed the subject fees. Sixth, the 
trial court made no finding, and no evidence establishes the 
essential requirement, that Rothey or his predecessors relied 
in any respect upon the Bank's conduct. A plainer case for 
reversal cannot be conceived. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 3 day of February, 
1984. 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
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